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Abstract 
 
Response plans developed thoroughly are suggestive 
of a successful action, but there is a gap in the literature 
with respect to the way concerted efforts among 
organizations are planned and change during crises. 
Using organizational network data extracted from the 
South Korean government’s MERS response manuals, 
we examined the changes in the response coordination 
network planned during the epidemic’s distinct stages. 
The greatest difference in predicting tie formation was 
found in the networks planned before the event and 
revised during the outbreak. Local and governmental 
actors tend to form more ties consistently in the revised 
manuals. Two actors that are intended to transfer 
medical and/or personnel resources tend to form more 
ties across all stages. These findings suggest that 
transferring material and/or human resources are key 
activities in the epidemic response and planners tend to 
increase the connection of local and governmental 
actors over time. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV; MERS) is a global pandemic threat that 
attacked Saudi Arabia first in September 2012. As of 
May 15, 2019, 2,374 cases were confirmed in the 
laboratory and 823 deaths have occurred in 27 countries 
[32]. On May 20, 2015, South Korea reported its first 
confirmed MERS-CoV case, and the outbreak ended 
with 38 deaths, 186 confirmed, and 16,752 suspected 
cases [16]. Until now, South Korea remains the country 
with the second largest number of confirmed MERS-
CoV cases after Saudi Arabia [32]. 
Because MERS-CoV is not transmitted socially, in 
that the infection occurs primarily within a closed 
environment, such as the hospital, it has been announced 
that there is no community-acquired case [32]. 
Therefore, the widespread outbreak and the high 
mortality in the country are attributed primarily to the 
inadequate response and policy failures rather than 
biological factors. Follow-up studies generally have 
agreed on the ineffectiveness of the response by the 
government and the country in general and expressed 
concerns about their epidemic response capacity [17] 
[18] [7] [19].  
The country’s health authorities, for example, Korea 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) 
and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), had 
been aware of the MERS-CoV outbreak since 2012, and 
prepared the MERS-CoV specific response manual in 
July 2014 [21]. However, the government’s preparation 
for the MERS response does not necessarily mean that 
stakeholders and the public were aware of such a manual 
or ready to implement (or capable of implementing) the 
response plans stated in it. Further, the manual was 
updated multiple times before and during the outbreak 
(eight times by the end of 2015). The response failure is 
more troubling given the health authority’s multiple 
revisions (i.e., efforts to improve response coordination 
by adapting to the evolving situation).  
To understand the way the Korean government’s 
efforts ended with unwanted outcomes, one must ask 
how the efforts to coordinate key stakeholder 
organizations were planned as well as implemented [20]. 
While limited, this study analyzes planned coordination 
networks among key stakeholder organizations in the 
nine versions of the MERS response manual as the 
epidemic progressed. This study contributes to the 
emergency management literature by addressing the 
lack of empirical studies on the way epidemic response 
plans are designed and revised.   
 
2. Emergency response plans 
 
2.1. Emergency planning and written plans 
 
The emergency management literature has noted 
distinctions between emergency planning and written 
plans. Perry and Lindell differentiated the planning 
process from written plans, suggesting that planning is 
an on-going process or activity, including plan-making, 
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training, and exercises [27]. In contrast, a written plan is 
a snapshot of the planning process at a specific time, but 
it includes procedural documents, checklists, extended 
plans, and principles learned in the planning process. 
Written plans are “living documents” embodied in the 
planning process that should be revised and changed as 
the crisis proceeds.  
Plans, in general, are bureaucratic products that 
describe formally what society expects of stakeholder 
organizations and what organizations expect of 
themselves [4] [5]. Brown and Eriksson suggested that 
unrealistic plans with a formal expectation alone may 
lead directly or indirectly to response failures, and thus, 
emergency management plans need to be written in a 
more realistic form that reflects the spectrum of threats 
and organizational capabilities’ inadequacy [4]. 
However, lengthy, detailed, and threat-specific plans are 
costly (time-consuming and laborious) to maintain 
because they require constant revision to avoid the risk 
of irrelevance [27]. Previous studies have revealed that 
planners’ uniqueness at the individual level (i.e., their 
political power, capability, and dedication in making 
plans for an emergency [1] [12] [11]), and bureaucratic 
realities on the organizational level [4], affect the 
development of an ideal emergency response plan. 
Nevertheless, response plans are likely to include 
two crucial pieces of information, first, which tasks are 
prioritized and need to be performed in a given crisis 
context. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC)’s public health 
emergency response guide specifies functions and tasks 
during different phases [6]. As an example, activities in 
the immediate response include assessing the situation; 
contacting key health personnel; developing initial 
health response objectives; establishing an action plan; 
involving public health participation in the emergency 
operation center; ensuring that the health and safety plan 
is established, reviewed, and followed; establishing 
communications with key health and medical 
organizations, and so forth. Second, the plans also may 
include the way to coordinate or collaborate with other 
stakeholder organizations and individuals during the 
crisis. However, response plans only are blueprints, in 
that they do not, or cannot necessarily specify all 
partners or stakeholders in detail [5]. They are more 
likely to define only the key actors and their relations in 
a general way. These key stakeholders and their 
relations constitute the planned response coordination 
networks.  
Lack of coordination among stakeholders has been 
perceived as the greatest weakness and the greatest 
source of difficulties in emergency response [10].  
Understanding the changes in planned coordination 
networks in the domain of emergency management is 
particularly important given an emergency response’s 
inherently collaborative nature [9]. Because of the 
difficulty acquiring appropriate data and inferential 
techniques, little research has been conducted on the 
network changes in emergency management [28]. In 
this paper, we use the response manual dataset Kim, Ku, 
and Oh collected and analyzed [20]. However, unlike 
Kim and her colleagues, we examine the critical 
components of tie formation in the network planned by 
examining particular types of actors and activities 
during different stages of the epidemic.  
 
2.2. Predicting planned coordination networks 
 
Which actors are intended to play a significant role 
and also coordinate most with other actors in epidemic 
response plans? In several countries (e.g., U.S., Canada, 
and South Korea), a nation’s public health system 
addresses public health emergencies [21] [22], which 
implies that all levels of government (local, provincial, 
and national) are involved in the response. However, 
before the outbreak, uncertainty about the likelihood 
that a disease will occur in a country is high. Although 
not always, infectious diseases can be introduced from 
the outside through a human or animal vector. Therefore, 
a major effort in response plans is to establish 
quarantines in airports and harbors where people enter 
from outside the country. Further, suspected cases that 
enter the country or are infected within the country are 
most likely to visit a local hospital, and the hospital or 
local health clinic that the suspected case visits is 
required to report the case to the country’s health 
authority immediately. This situation demands local 
first-response actors, such as local quarantine stations, 
health clinics, and hospitals, to coordinate their response 
to suspected cases because they are on the frontline in 
the fight against the disease. Local actors’ importance 
may not change during the outbreak because they 
remain the first line of defense in the response and 
perform crucial tasks such as surveillance and patient 
management.  
 
H1: A local actor is more likely to establish a 
connection with other actors than its counterparts at 
higher ranks (i.e., national, provincial).  
 
As any emergency tends to cross jurisdictional and 
departmental boundaries because of its geographic 
scope and broad range of consequences [14] [15] [28], 
it is reasonable to assume that the responding actor’s 
sector is an important attribute to examine in its 
participation in the response. That is, emergency 
response involves diverse agencies in multiple sectors 
(i.e., governmental or non-governmental sectors, 
including the private—i.e., airlines, medical waste 
treatment companies—or the non-profit sectors—i.e., 
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medical professional and academic associations). 
Previous studies have noted that voluntary civil society 
organizations also participate in the response, for 
example, non-profit organizations in the local 
community [23]. Considering the government’s public 
responsiveness and major duty in emergency response, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that governmental 
actors are required to play a more important role during 
the response, particularly in such public health 
emergencies as infectious disease outbreaks.  
 
H2: A governmental actor is more likely to establish 
a connection with other actors than are non-
governmental actors. 
 
The key stakeholders may change as the crisis type 
varies [8]. For example, in a wildfire or hurricane crisis, 
we may expect fire departments to play a leading role 
because of their expertise in managing such disasters 
[26]. In attacks people perpetrate, such as 9-11, the 
police department is supposed to make a significant 
contribution. It is reasonable to assume that health actors, 
such as hospitals, medical research centers, and the 
government’s health department, will play the leading 
roles in response to an infectious disease outbreak. 
Similarly, as the major duty of non-health actors, such 
as fire departments, is saving lives and extinguishing 
fires, they are less likely to be prioritized in a health 
agency manual. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that health actors will be intended to be the first 
responders in the case of infectious diseases, and to 
establish connections with others than will non-health 
actors.  
 
H3: Health actors are more likely to establish 
connections with other actors than are non-health actors.   
 
The four crucial response activities in public health 
emergencies are surveillance, patient management, 
epidemiological investigation, and laboratory testing 
[31]. Surveillance and patient management are related 
to recognizing and reporting suspected cases to health 
authorities promptly, as well as managing confirmed 
cases and their close contacts [31]. Once a suspected or 
confirmed case is reported, public health agencies 
perform epidemiological investigation to identify the 
disease’s cause and consequences at the locations where 
the cases are identified, such as hospitals. Laboratory 
testing is necessary to identify the pathogen that causes 
the disease or diagnose suspected cases, which rely on 
protective equipment and facilities. Therefore, we 
assume that the activities related to requesting or 
providing such medical equipment as screening tools 
and protective equipment, and human resources, such as 
epidemiologists and disease professionals, were most 
likely to be included in the response manuals.  
Homophily hypotheses can be used to examine such 
transfer activities. The homophily effect refers to 
reciprocal ties’ influence in predicting tie formation, 
which can result from two mechanisms: 1) two agencies 
that are assigned to conduct key activities, such as 
exchanging medical and/or human resources, and 2) two 
agencies that are not intended to conduct key activities, 
but other activities instead. Because key activities are 
more important in the epidemic response, we do not 
expect that the second mechanism contributes to tie 
formation. Thus, we focused on the first mechanism and 
differentiated the homophily effect and proposed H4 
and H5. 
 
H4: Two agencies, both of which are intended to 
transfer materials, are more likely to form a tie. 
H5: Two agencies, both of which are intended to 
transfer human resources, are more likely to form a tie.  
 
When responding to a public health emergency, 
stakeholders’ appropriate roles and responsibilities in all 
phases must be assigned in advance [3]. As planners 
acquire knowledge about the disease outbreak, they are 
likely to revise the written plans to respond to the 
changing situation. Regardless of the activities included 
in response plans and the way they are specified, plans 
in an action field have inherent limitations in their 
ability to guide an emergency response, and their 
usefulness has long been debated [5] [27] [30]. By 
examining the actors, activities, and coordination plans 
in the written documents, we can obtain a basic 
understanding of what priorities the government set 
during the emergency and which agencies were intended 
to act in the critical and supportive tasks.  
 
3. Data and methods  
 
3.1. Data 
 
KCDC prepared the first MERS-CoV response 
manual in July 2014 and revised it eight times before the 
epidemic ended on December 23, 2015 [21] [22]. The 
manual’s nine versions were obtained when they 
became available online on the Korean government’s 
MERS-CoV website. The stages’ division of the 
epidemic is based on the way the Korean government 
distinguished the epidemic’s progress. Table 1 below 
shows the MERS-CoV epidemic’s stages and the month 
each version was published.  
 
Table 1. Response manual version list 
Stage Versions 
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Before  
(before May 20, 
2015) 
 
• ver. 1: July 2014 
• ver. 2: December 2014 
 
Early  
(May 20, 2015–
June 8, 2015) 
 
• ver. 3-1: May 2015 
• ver. 3-2: June 2015 
Peak  
(June 9, 2015–
July 27, 2015) 
 
• ver. 3-3: June 2015 
• ver. 3-3-1: June 2015 
• ver. 3-3-2: June 2015 
 
Waning  
(July 28, 2015–
December 23, 
2015) 
• ver. 3-4: July 2015 
• ver. 3-5: August 2015 
 
The author of the paper and a graduate student, both 
of whom are fluent in Korean, analyzed the response 
manuals’ content and collected the planned coordination 
networks among the key actors in the manuals.  
 
3.2. Response coordination networks 
 
The response manuals were designed to direct 
coordinated efforts among key stakeholder 
organizations in the four critical tasks during the disease 
outbreak⎯reporting suspected cases, laboratory testing, 
epidemiological investigation, and patient management 
[20] [21] [22]. These tasks involve transferring 
information, specimens, equipment, human resources, 
or patients between organizations because different 
organizations possess different resources, skills, and 
knowledge. The manual also listed other supporting 
activities in addition to the four critical tasks, and most 
of the critical and supportive tasks were required to be 
performed through direct or indirect coordinated actions 
with other organizations. 
The manual defined actors in two different ways: 
individual organizations and collectives (groups of 
organizations; i.e., local fire stations) because the 
location of an outbreak is uncertain until it actually 
occurs. Central government departments are easy to 
identify, but organizations at the local level or in other 
sectors (e.g., airlines) are difficult to list in the response 
manual. To be consistent with actors in our analysis, we 
use groups of organizations (i.e., collectives) as network 
actors. To do so, individual organizations and groups of 
organizations were grouped based on their scope of 
service (national, provincial, or local), 
function/specialty (e.g., police, fire, health), as well as 
whether they are governmental or non-governmental 
organizations. We were able to identify 16 planned 
actors. Table 2 summarizes the list of actors in the 
manual.  
 
Table 2. Actor list 
ID Actors 
A(HA) Academic Associations (Medical) 
A(MP) Professional Associations (Medical) 
C(MW) Medical Waste Treatment Companies 
C(TP) Airlines or Ships 
H Hospitals 
HD Designated Hospitals 
LFS Local Fire Stations 
LG Local Governments 
LHC Local Health Clinics 
LPS Local Police Stations 
LQS Local Quarantine Stations 
NHD National Health Departments 
NPE(TP) National Public Enterprises 
NSD Other Central Government Departments 
PG Provincial Governments 
PHR Provincial Health and Environmental 
Research Institutes 
 
Note that in Table 2, IDs with an H refer to health 
actors, while those without an H are non-health actors. 
IDs with an N refer to national level actors, those with a 
P to provincial level actors, and those with an L to local 
level actors. In addition, A(HA) and A(MP) are national, 
non-governmental, and health related, while C(MW) 
and C(TP) are national, non-governmental, and non-
health-related actors. 
 
3.3. Exponential random graph models 
 
Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are tie-
based statistical models used to understand social 
structures. ERGMs are based on the idea that a larger 
network can be analyzed by studying the presence of 
smaller network configurations [25]. The network 
configurations (or smaller constituent parts) provide 
mathematical explanations for the way the ties might be 
present in a network [25]. For example, the homophily 
configuration is a local structure in which two actors 
with the same attributes (e.g., conduct the same task) 
tend to form a reciprocal tie. ERGMs give each 
configuration a parameter estimate and a standard error, 
whereby we may: 1) infer whether each parameter 
increases or decreases the likelihood of tie formation in 
the network by looking at the sign of the estimate 
(positive or negative), and 2) assess the results’ 
statistical significance by comparing the difference in 
the absolute value of the standard error and estimate. 
ERGMs equation describes the probability 
distribution for a graph with n nodes and l 
configurations, which can be written as follows: 
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𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥|𝜃) ≡
1
𝑘(𝜃)
𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝜃1𝑧1(𝑥) + 𝜃2𝑧2(𝑥) + ⋯
+ 𝜃𝑙𝑧𝑙(𝑥)} 
 
in which 𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥|𝜃) is the probability distribution of 
the network given all of the smaller configurations 
described in the equation; 
1
𝑘(𝜃)
 is the normalizing 
constant that ensures the sum of the probability remains 
within 0 to 1; 𝜃𝑙  is the coefficient of the network 
statistics of interest, and 𝑧𝑘(𝑥) is the counts of 
configurations that include statistics 𝑘 . 
We included four configurations related to our 
hypotheses. For the actor/node-level, we focused on 
three attributes: the scope of service, government level, 
and specialty. The scope of service refers to the level 
(i.e., local, provincial, or national) that an agency can 
control or influence, with which we can examine the 
way an actor’s scope of service influences the likelihood 
of forming a tie. The government refers to the sector to 
which an actor belongs. Whether the actor is a 
government agency will affect the probability that it 
forms a tie with another actor. Specialty refers to an 
actor’s major responsibility or function in the response.  
Dyad-level predictors were used when we 
hypothesized that a particular characteristic in a dyad 
affects the probability of observing a tie in the network. 
For this study, the dyadic attributes are the same 
activities two actors perform (e.g., both are planned to 
report a suspected case or send a specimen). We 
supposed that coordination activities of transferring 
human resources and/or materials contribute 
substantially to the network density. Table 3 presents the 
variables and values assigned to the attributes.  
 
Table 3. Variables 
Level Predictors Values 
Node-level  Scope 0 Local 
1 Provincial 
2 National 
Government 0 Non-government 
1 Government 
 Specialty  0 Non-health  
1 Health 
Dyad-level Transferring 
material 
0 No 
1Yes 
 Transferring 
people 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
For each stage in the network, we began by building 
a null model with the same number of edges and nodes 
as the planned response network. The null models were 
used as a baseline to judge the degree to which 
subsequent models improved. The probability of 
observing a tie in the estimated networks can be 
calculated by taking the logistic transformation of the 
edge parameters added in the subsequent models.  
Once the null models were obtained, the simulated 
models were built by adding node- and dyadic-level 
predictors to the null models. In particular, dyadic 
attributes allowed us to test the homophily hypotheses 
(H4 and H5). We compared these models based on 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Goodness of 
Fit (GoF) values and chose the best fit models to 
interpret the importance of the configurations of interest. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Network characteristics 
 
Table 4 presents the planned response network’s 
characteristics during the epidemic’s different stages 
observed from the response manuals. Of 16 actors, 15 
were planned to coordinate in the manual before the 
outbreak. The number of connected actors reduced in 
the subsequent response manuals, such that 13 were 
found to be connected in the waning stage of the crisis. 
Each network was fairly dense, and the density 
increased over stages, which led to the interesting result 
that as the number of connected actors and the total 
connections decreased, the network density increased. 
The average clustering coefficients were between 0.44 
and 0.50, indicating that there were some clustering 
effects in each network.  
 
Table 4. Network measures 
 Before Early Peak Waning 
 (s0) (s1) (s2) (s3) 
Nodes 15 15 14 13 
Ties 110 118 135 111 
Avg. degree 2.67 2.87 3.50 3.08 
Density 0.52 0.56 0.73 0.71 
Avg. clustering 
coefficient (cc) 
0.45 0.44 0.5 0.5 
 
Figure 1 includes the networks designed before (s0) 
and during the peak (s2) of the outbreak for illustration 
purposes. Before the outbreak, the planners conceived 
that local actors, such as LHC and LQS together with 
NHD, would be at the center of the response 
coordination network (Figure 1(a)). However, as the 
planners acquired more knowledge of the crisis and the 
crisis became more severe, LHC remained at the center, 
but NHD and PG’s roles appeared to be enhanced. NHD, 
PG, and LHC’s positions became more apparent at the 
peak in Figure 1(b). With some changes, the structure 
and central actors remained somewhat consistent over 
time. 
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(a) Planned before the outbreak (s0) 
 
 
(b) Changed at the peak (s2) 
 
Figure 1. Response networks 
 
4.2. Coordination networks during different 
stages 
 
4.2.1. Overall examination of all stages. In Table 6, we 
examined our hypothesized model by adding node- and 
dyad-level attributes to the null model (Table 5). The 
results showed several interesting points. First, the AIC 
values of the estimated model during each stage 
decreased considerably compared to the null model, 
indicating the selected parameters used in our model 
explained the data during each stage better. Second, 
given that the parameters’ logit transformation was 
calculated to give the networks’ density overall, the 
Logit values during s1-s3 increased greatly compared to 
the null model, except for s0. This result indicated that 
before the outbreak, the planners were less informed of 
the crisis’ nature, and which types of actors or activities 
to include in the response manual, which resonated with 
the descriptive results of the actors’ number and 
networks’ density in 4.1.  
 
Table 5. Null models 
 Before 
(s0) 
Early  
(s1) 
Peak 
(s2) 
Waning 
(s3) 
Estimates 
(SE) 
-1.45 
(0.18)*** 
-1.39 
(0.17)*** 
-1.08 
(0.17)*** 
-1.10 
(0.18)*** 
AIC 
Logit 
206.5 
0.19 
212.2 
0.2 
207.8 
0.25 
177.4 
0.25 
*** p<0.01      ** p<0.05      * p<0.1 
 
Table 6. Predicting tie formation  
 Before 
(s0) 
Early  
(s1) 
Peak 
(s2) 
Waning 
(s3) 
Estimates 
(SE) 
-2.85 
(1.03)*** 
-4.03 
(1.06)*** 
 
-4.13 
(0.92)*** 
-5.33 
(1.42)*** 
Scope 
Provincial     
    
National               
 
0.10 
(0.62) 
0.12 
(0.42) 
 
-1.21 
(0.52)** 
-0.64 
(0.36)* 
 
-1.68 
(0.62)*** 
-1.12 
(0.48)** 
 
-1.12 
(0.54)** 
-0.56 
(0.42) 
Govt. -0.12 
(0.58) 
1.53 
(0.44)*** 
1.60 
(0.49)*** 
1.12 
(0.50)** 
Health 
     
0.81 
(0.41)** 
0.75 
(0.51) 
0.44 
(0.49) 
2.42 
(1.20)** 
Material 
Material0 
        
Material1 
 
-2.38 
(0.89)*** 
1.78 
(0.60)*** 
 
-0.10 
(0.64) 
1.80 
(0.62)*** 
 
0.16 
(0.80) 
2.78 
(0.74)*** 
 
2.08 
(1.32) 
0.39 
(1.23) 
People 
People0 
        
People1 
          
-2.45 
(1.16)** 
2.97 
(0.72)***  
  
0.37 
(0.56) 
1.22 
(0.54)** 
 
 0.22 
(0.55) 
1.42 
(0.53)*** 
 
0.84 
(0.60) 
1.37 
(0.56)** 
AIC 134.5 172.7 163.9 147.3 
Logit 0.12 0.42 0.42 0.77 
*** p<0.01      ** p<0.05      * p<0.1 
 
In Table 6, the most striking difference was observed 
in the comparison between s0 (Before) and s1, s2, and 
s3 (during the outbreak). We interpret the results in 
depth below. 
 
4.2.2. Before the outbreak (s0). Two node-level 
attributes, scope and government, did not contribute 
significantly to the network density during s0. Planners 
did not pay significant attention to the scope of actors’ 
service, and to which sector they belonged when making 
plans before the crisis. However, health is statistically 
significant, indicating that planners focused on 
assigning health-related actors to coordinate in the 
network. Further, the results indicated that the 
homophily effects on material and people were mixed. 
The homophily effects were contributed by two actors, 
NPE(TP)
LQS
LHC
PHR
LFS
LG PG
H
C(MW)
NHD
NSD
HD
A(HA)
C(TP)
A(MP)
LPS
NPE(TP)
LQS
LHC
PHR
LFS
LG
PG
H
C(MW)
NHD
NSD
HD
C(TP)
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both of which were planned, or neither was planned to 
transfer material and human resources. These two 
mechanisms of the homophily effect had different 
influences on the outcome. The reciprocal relationship 
between actors that were planned neither to transfer 
material and/or people decreased the probability of 
observing a tie in the network significantly. In other 
words, conducting the supportive activities other than 
transferring material and/or people decreased the 
probability of tie formation. In contrast, the two actors, 
both of which were planned to be involved in 
transferring materials and/or people, increased the 
likelihood of observing a tie in the network significantly.  
 
4.2.3. During the outbreak (s1-s3). The estimates of 
the scope of service on the provincial and national levels 
were negative and significant from s1 to s3, suggesting 
that national and provincial actors reduced the 
probability of tie formation significantly compared to 
local actors. Thus, planners envisioned that assigning 
tasks to local actors was more likely to enhance tight 
coordination. Further, government was associated 
positively and significantly with the probability of tie 
formation during these stages, indicating that planners 
began to rely on governmental actors to increase 
coordination. The estimate of health actors predicted tie 
formation positively and significantly during s0, but not 
significant during s1 and s2. The probability that health 
and non-health actors would form ties did not differ 
statistically significantly in the early and peak stages, 
while in the waning stage, health-related actors were 
planned again to coordinate with other actors, as during 
s0. Unlike during s0, the positive and significant results 
for two dyadic variables during the outbreak (s1-s3) 
indicated that two agencies who are both planned to 
transfer material and human resources had strong 
homophily effects on predicting the tie formation. In 
other words, two actors, both of which were planned to 
exchange materials, contributed to the homophily effect. 
Two actors that were not planned to be involved in those 
key activities did not contribute to the tie formation in 
the network. 
 
4.2.4. Summary of findings. Each of the parameters in 
Table 6 represents different configurations. An overall 
comparison of the parameters during each stage 
revealed some differences. First, the estimates of scope 
and government were significant during s1, s2, and s3, 
indicating that local and governmental agencies were 
planned to play important roles in coordination during 
the outbreak; thus, H1 and H2 were supported in part. 
Second, the health specialty was associated positively 
with the probability of tie formation during the Before 
and Waning stages, but had little influence during the 
Early and Peak stages, indicating that as the outbreak 
became severe, the Korean government decided to rely 
on more supportive agencies to isolate suspected and 
confirmed cases; thus, H3 was supported in part. Third, 
the results that two actors, both of which were planned 
to transfer physical and/or human resources, were more 
likely to increase the network density during s1-s3 
shows that planners realized the importance of assigning 
actors to perform key activities during the outbreak. 
However, before the outbreak, two actors, neither of 
which was planned to transfer physical and/or human 
resources, also contributed to the homophily effect, 
indicating that the planners did not consider the key 
activities particularly critical to the response. Thus, H4 
and H5 were supported in part. Table 7 presents a 
summary of the results.  
 
Table 7. ERGM results (summary) 
 Before 
(s0) 
Early 
(s1) 
Peak 
(s2) 
Waning 
(s3) 
H1 Reject Accept 
H2 Reject Accept 
H3 Accept Reject Accept 
H4 Reject Accept 
H5 Reject Accept 
 
4.2.5. Goodness-of-fit. The goodness-of-fit (GOF) test 
was performed to ensure that there were no major 
problems with the convergence [24]. A model fits well 
when a simulated network is as extreme as the network 
observed. Our models across the four stages all 
demonstrated a good fit, with most p-values in the GOF 
test above 0.5 and close to 1. This simple model with 
eight parameters captured the structural patterns in the 
planned networks during each stage well. In Figure 2, 
we presented the diagnostic plots during s0 and s2 with 
95% confidence intervals for illustration purposes. They 
show that our models fit well with the observed network 
because there was little variation in each network’s 
statistics across the simulated network.  
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a. Model Fit Before the Outbreak (s0) 
 
 
b. Model Fit During the Peak (s2) 
 
Figure 2. Diagnostic plots 
 
5. Discussion  
One step in developing more solid theoretical 
accounts of response plans for an emergency is to 
examine what constitutes a useful and realistic plan. In 
this study, the network arrangements that can affect tie 
formation between actors were drawn from actor- and 
dyad-level attributes in the MERS response manuals in 
South Korea before and during the outbreak. We 
hypothesized that the probability of tie formation is a 
function of agencies’ scope of service, sector 
(governmental vs. non-governmental), specialty (health 
vs. non-health related agency), and the actor’s match in 
activities related to key activities, i.e., transferring 
material and/or personnel resources.  
After examining the network data with ERGM 
analysis, we found: 1) compared to the response plan 
prepared before the outbreak, some adjustments were 
made to enhance the connections between local and 
governmental actors. While Table 4 shows that the 
networks became denser over time, Table 6 suggests 
that the increasing density derived from those local and 
governmental actors; 2) Health actors’ role was unclear 
during the Early and Peak stages, suggesting that as the 
outbreak became severe, planners began to emphasize 
the role of non-health actors, and sought the support 
from police and fire departments to isolate people 
suspected to be infected, and 3) The differential 
homophily effect with respect to the exchange of 
materials and human resources was observed 
consistently over time, and proved to be associated 
positively and significantly with the likelihood of tie 
formation during all stages. This result also suggested 
that actors that were planned to transfer human 
resources, including experts, doctors, nurses and other 
professionals, were more likely to establish connections 
with others.  
The difference in the response coordination plans 
between before (s0) and during (s1-s3) the outbreak is 
worth noting here. Such a discrepancy showed that 
planners had little idea of the way to plan for an 
unknown emergency until they experienced it. Their 
lack of operational experience in planning can be 
explained from two perspectives. First, before the 
outbreak, they had little experience on what type of 
actors and activities to include in the manuals. Therefore, 
they selected to involve as many actors as possible to 
eliminate the potential threats to a large extent, 
regardless of the actors’ characteristics. For example, 
hospitals may play the major role in the response 
network by treating the patients effectively. It also is 
likely that non-health actors will play the leading role in 
identifying and isolating confirmed cases to reduce the 
infection rate. Second, there was discordance between 
the planners’ perceived threats and the activities that 
needed to be involved before the outbreak. As the results 
during s0 show, the homophily effect that resulted from 
transferring material or personnel was attributable 
simultaneously to two types of actors, one of which was 
assigned the key activities, while the other was assigned 
other supportive tasks. Unfortunately, the probability of 
forming a tie was decreased by the two agencies that 
were planned to conduct supportive activities, which are 
irrelevant to key activities like transferring material 
and/or personnel.  
This article provided evidence for the constant 
revisions in response plans during different epidemic 
stages. During the revision process, the Korean 
government chose to continue to involve only key actors 
rather than including more actors in the response manual. 
In addition, the government chose to increase the 
connection among the key actors over time. This 
tendency to keep core actors in the response plan is 
consistent with others’ observation [28]. In our study, 
the core actors were composed of those that are local, 
governmental, and health-related. One drawback of the 
decision is that the response manual continues to ignore 
international actors (or perhaps other actors) that were 
critical in responding to the disease effectively.  
We used a small network dataset that consists of 16 
core actors that were supposed to prepare for and 
respond to the epidemic event. At least, we observed 
certain changes to adapt to the evolving situation by 
increasing the effort to build connections with other 
actors on the part of such core actors as local, 
governmental, and health actors. We cannot judge 
whether the adjustment was sufficient only by looking 
at the planned response data. Given the wide recognition 
that the MERS response was a failed case, the 
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insufficiency in the revisions needs to be examined 
thoroughly elsewhere. Moreover, emergency response 
is managed not only by the core actors, but also by 
emergent actors, which can change the response 
network’s structure, stability, and effectiveness. Our 
next study will examine the way this planned 
coordination actually unfolded in the response process, 
to determine whether the changes the planners made 
during each stage were meaningful to the actual 
responders. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Societies are unlikely to know in advance when and 
what type of crisis will occur. However, it is necessary 
to formulate a plan that assumes such an event will 
occur, and to ask stakeholders to act on that plan if the 
presumed event does occur. On the other hand, 
following the plan as it is designed may not always bring 
positive or intended results because of unforeseen 
contingencies. The emergency management literature 
has recognized well that formal policies and plans are 
limited inherently in responding to disruptive events [2] 
[3] [29]. Nonetheless, the gaps between planned and 
implemented networks may not be identified easily 
unless the response plans are scrutinized and analyzed 
thoroughly. This study fills a gap in the emergency 
management literature by examining the design features 
and changes in coordination plans among key actors in 
South Korea’s MERS response manual.  
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